A so-called "incentive contract" is a linear payment schedule, where the buyer pays a fixed fee plus some proportion of audited project cost. That remaining proportion of project cost borne by the seller is called the "sharing ratio." A higher sharing ratio creates more incentive to reduce costs. But it also makes the agent bear more cost uncertainty, requiring as compensation a greater fixed fee. The tradeoff between incentives and risk in determining the sharing ratio of an efficient contract is the central theme of the present paper. A formula is derived that shows how the optimal sharing ratio depends on such features as uncertainty, risk aversion, and the contractor's ability to control costs. Some numerical examples are calculated from the area of defense contracting.
CONTRACT TYPES
Two polar contract types4 have been in widespread use for a long time.
At one extreme is the "cost plus" contract (Cost Plus Fixed Fee = CPFF). This contract type pays actual costs plus a fixed dollar fee that is usually determined as some percentage of a cost estimate. Once set, the fee is fixed. The buyer additionally compensates (within limits) all legally allowable costs incurred by the contractor in fulfilling the project. The CPFF contract has the significant drawback of providing no incentive for cost reduction, which results in a well-known tendency to cost overrun.
The opposite extreme is the "fixed price" contract (Firm Fixed Price = FFP). Here the contractor agrees to fulfill the project for a fixed dollar price, which, once negotiated, will not be readjusted to include actual cost experience. With every dollar of cost saved ending up a dollar of extra profits, a strong incentive is created to reduce project cost. The disadvantage of the FFP arrangement is that the firm, bearing all the risk, must be compensated by a fee representing on average a high nominal profit rate.
The "incentive contract" falls between the polar extremes of CPFF and FFP. Sometimes called Cost Plus Incentive Fee = CPIF, sometimes Fixed Price Incentive = FPI (depending on which of CPFF or FFP was its conceptual antecedent), an incentive contract essentially pays a fixed fee plus some fraction of project costs.5 No matter how varied the way it is represented or the names of its different parameters, the principal's payment under an incentive contract can always be written in the reduced form:
where X is the accounting cost of the project, K is the fixed fee, and A is the agent's share of project costs (the principal's share is I -O). Note that A = 0 is cost plus and A = 1 is fixed price. Thus, CPFF and FFP are special polar cases of expression (1).
An incentive contract offers the possibility of striking a balance between the positive incentive effect of a high sharing ratio and the negative risk effect. The purpose of this paper is to formulate the 4. For more detailed information see Cummins [1977] 6. In practice, it is difficult to measure precisely (or even to define) project-related costs, and some degree of arbitrariness is inevitable. Certain costs can be attributed directly to the project. But others, like overhead costs, cannot easily be assigned to one activity or another, and some project costs, like managerial attention, are hard to measure, observe, or monitor.
Once set, K and X cannot be renegotiated. But after the uncertainty resolves itself, the firm will adjust discretionary action under its control to maximize total profits, given K and A.
Let 0 represent a state of the world bearing on this project. For example, materials might be more or less expensive, construction conditions may vary, research and development outcomes could differ, etc.
In When X < 1, condition (5) indicates inefficiency, because the marginal rate of transformation between project costs and revenue earned elsewhere is not one to one. Instead, a dollar saved on the project is only equivalent to the fraction X of an extra dollar earned on other activities of the firm, due to partial reimbursement of project costs at 1 -X to the dollar. The lower X is, the less the incentive is to cut costs on the contracting activity at the expense of profits in the rest of the firm. On the other hand, when X is higher, the agent must bear a greater share of cost risk, and K must be made sufficiently larger to induce the firm to accept the contract.
EFFICIENT INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
Parameters K and A are fixed when the state of the world is uncertain. That level of expected utility that the firm obtains is a function of its bargaining strength and the kind of negotiating process that takes place. Whether determined by bilateral confrontation or competitive bidding, it is in the common interest of buyer and seller to negotiate parameter values that are Pareto efficient with respect to the given form of the contract. Even if forces making for Pareto op-timality are weak in practice, characterizing an efficient incentive contract is still an important normative issue. This is especially true because, as long as the optimal sharing ratio is relatively invariant to expected utility levels, the buyer can set it at the efficient value and limit negotiations to determining the fixed fee.
Assuming that the theoretical difficulties associated with representing collective choices are insignificant, let the agent's utility function be U(-) and the principal's utility function be V(-). For most applications V is more linear than U, because the government (or any large buyer) is likely to be less risk-averse than the contractor. In fact, the government is frequently assumed to be risk-neutral as a first approximation. Let U be a given level of the contractor's expected utility (it may be varied parametrically). The expected value operator over 0 is denoted E.
An efficient incentive contract (X*,K*) solves the problem, Formally speaking, (7)-(9) has a generic relationship to problems in the theory of optimal income taxation and competitive insurance contracts.7 However, besides being worthy of analysis on its own merits as an important economic issue, the efficient incentive contract has a special structure that allows a distinctive characterization.
THE OPTIMAL SHARING RATIO
Our main interest is in characterizing the sharing ratio X*, which is the solution of (7)-(9). Once X* is determined, the optimal fixed fee K* can be calculated as a residual from equation (8).
With X0(X) and A(X) defined as solutions of (9) By (6), the last two terms of (11) drop out, allowing it to be rewritten in the form, (12) K'(X) = EXU'/EU'.
Given that K(A) is determined by (10) with X6(X) and {a(X) solutions of (9), problem (7)-(9) becomes simply (13) max EV(-K(X) -(1 -X)Xo(X)). X
The corresponding first-order condition is 
=-XX/XV.
Employing (16)-(19), I can coax condition (15) into the form,
X*
=w( X-1+
Equation (20) is the basic result of the present paper. Naturally, the first-order condition (15) can be written in a variety of forms, but expression (20) perhaps has the most intuitive economic interpretation.
From (16), Xu is a weighted average project cost, where the weights are the agent's marginal utility of income in various states of the world times the probability of occurrence. As such, Xu is the expected "real cost" of the project to the contractor.
Analogously, X, is the weighted average project cost, where the weights are the buyer's marginal utility of income in various states of the world multiplied by the probability of occurrence. Given these same weights, Xv is the average derivative of project cost with respect to the sharing ratio.
The number e of (19) is an elasticity-like measure. It is akin to an average percentage cost reduction for a 1 percent increase in the sharing ratio, where the averaging is done in a special way. As such, e is some measure of the responsiveness of project costs to changes in the sharing ratio. If e is big, on average, X responds elastically to A; if e is small, response is inelastic. Note that when uncertainty is multiplicative, i.e., on (31) and (32). Especially striking to me are the rather high values of X* that seem to emerge. My "average" specification z = 1.5, 3 = 1.25 yields X* = 86 percent. In most reasonable scenarios it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that X* ought to be above 50 percent, sometimes well above.10 This result is perhaps a bit surprising, especially in view of the low cost elasticities being assumed.
Of course, the model is a gross oversimplification of reality, and calculations based on it should be cautiously received. But at least this framework provides some basis for determining sharing ratios-which brings us to a concluding note. This type of model often does not admit a closed-form solution when modified to suit particular applications. Nevertheless, simulations are usually tractable and lead to significant insights into the nature of an efficient contract.
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